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A Campus in Context: East
Pakistan’s “Mass Upsurge” at Local,
Regional, and International Scales
Samantha Christiansen
1 Throughout the 1960s, reportage of student activism on campuses across the world was
regularly seen in newspapers, on televisions, and even in worried government reports.
Indeed, in 1968, the United States Central Intelligence Agency composed a two-volume
report  on student  activism,  domestic  and international,  which was  entitled,  simply
“Restless Youth” (1968). Given the widespread occurrence of student revolt across the
world, historical understanding of the nuance and specific context of the movements
risks being overshadowed were reduced into a formulaic model. This article will focus
on the case study of East Pakistani student activism at Dhaka University in the late
1960s with attention to both the local particularities and an understanding of larger
regional and global contexts. Focusing on the period of 1964–1969, I will demonstrate
that students on Dhaka University engaged with different contexts and concerns—local,
regional,  and  international—through  their  activities  as  student  political  activists.
Through this varied scale of identity mobilization, student activism at Dhaka University
became contextualized within a larger network of spaces and movements in the 1960s
(Christiansen and Scarlett 2013; Marwick 1998; Zolov 1999). 
 
Places and Spaces for Movement at Dhaka University
2 As a place of theoretical departure, the notions of scale and place, with regard to social
movements and with regard to their usage this article, warrant some brief discussion.
The  common placement  of  Dhaka  University  student  mobilizations  in  a  nationalist
historical narrative of Bangladesh has created a strong framework through which the
history  of  student  movements  in  the  nation  are  linked  with  state-level  politics.  In
particular, with all of the focus on the nation, as students become intertwined with the
story of 1971’s Liberation War, the level of analysis rarely reaches that of the acutely
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local  level  of  the  campus  community  itself  or  extends  beyond  the  borders  of  the
Eastern wing of divided Pakistan. While Dhaka University as a symbolic place occupies
a  distinct  historical  identity  for  the  nation  and  continues  to  function  as  a  site  of
historical commemoration and ongoing contentious political demonstration, there is
little consideration of how the campus as a place connected students with other scales
of student movements, regionally and internationally, in both real and imagined terms.
3 The ways in which social movement participants interact with, contest, and manipulate
space during mobilization and action is a rich field of inquiry, and a great deal of it
owes  credit  to  the  groundbreaking  considerations  of  space  elucidated  by  Henri
Lefebvre (1974).  Lefebvre’s contention that in order to understand society, we must
consider it in the context of the spaces it produces, material and mental, re-oriented
spatial  analysis  and  offered  an  important  bridge  between  historical,  social  and
geographic analysis. Building off of Lefebvre’s ideas of the social production of space,
social geographers such as John Agnew argued for a distinction of “place” as an analytic
tool (1987). Agnew describes “place” as consisting of “three major elements: locale, the
settings  in  which  social  relations  are  constituted  (these  can  be  informal  or
institutional);  location,  the  geographical  area  encompassing  the  settings  for  social
interaction as defined by social and economic processes operating at a wider scale; and
a sense of place, the local “structure of feeling” (p. 28). Place, then, refers to the ways
that  social  activity  is  thought  of  geographically,  and  how that  process  of  thinking
shapes the activity within the space. Importantly though, as pointed out by Byron A.
Miller  (2000),  place  should  not  be  associated/considered  necessarily  with/as  being
local. Place can operate on a variety of geographic scales, and can be imagined into
varying levels of geographic scale.
4 With regard to the idea of geographic scale and social movements, Alberto Mellucci and
others have demonstrated that collective identities in social movements can operate in
different degrees of space (1989). On one hand, movement participants are mobilized
by  local  concerns  and work  within  local  power  structures,  but  on  the  other  hand,
movements apply larger-scale analysis and participants conceive of their identity in
relation to larger structural frameworks, such as capitalism or modernity. I argue that
considering  the  case  of  student  movements  in  the  1960s  at  Dhaka  University,
geographic scale operates consistently with Mellucci’s description of fluidity. For this
article, my intention is to combine Mellucci’s notions of fluidity and social movement
identity  with  Miller’s  theory  of  place  operating  on  multiple  levels  to  demonstrate
Dhaka University  student  activism as  simultaneously  linked to  a  very specific  local
context and a broader sense of regional and international collective identity. Using oral
history interviews conducted in Dhaka,  as  well  as  collected testimony from various
secondary sources, this article focuses on the Mass Upsurge campaign as a case study
for illustrating that various scales are not in competition or necessarily distinct in the
movement participants’ understanding and recollection of the movement in totality.
Indeed, we see the local, regional, and international dimensions as intertwined into a
complex and mutually constitutive set of goals and accomplishments. Dhaka University
students were concerned with specific campus and local issues, yet they also saw the
campus as one of many campuses; a global network of sites of contention and power
dealing  with  much  larger  scale  issues  such  as  the  emergence  of  the  New  Left,
imperialism,  and  global  youth  cultural  expression.  Notably,  in  all  of  the  scales,
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students’  relationship  to  the  place  of Dhaka  University  figures  into  the  collective
identity of the movement.
5 In  the  late  sixties,  at  the  local  level,  students  at  Dhaka  University  articulated  a
frustration with the economic and political disparity between the Eastern and Western
wings of Pakistan. Students became major supporters of the Awami League and its Six
Points  Platform,  and major  political  figures,  most  notably  Sheikh Mujibar  Rahman,
nurtured a close relationship with the campus and students. The local scale was also
deeply connected to regional concerns, as the 1965 war between India and Pakistan
highlighted the precarious reality of  East  Pakistan’s  military security.  The Indo-Pak
War  had  enraged  students  in  West  Pakistan  was  well,  who  mobilized  around
disapproval of the Tashkent Agreement which had ended the war. The shared anger
over the war gave students in both wings a common cause, one in opposition to the
Ayub Khan regime, although the specific grievances with the regime were different.
The  regional  dynamics  of  Mass  Upsurge,  the  dual  wing  campaign  that  ultimately
toppled Ayub’s rule, was an important level of interaction for the students. Finally, at
the international scale, students’ position in society, defined as “students,” connected
them ideologically,  and at  times  in  person,  to  a  larger  narrative  of  student  unrest
taking place around the world.  The campaign in Pakistan was seen as one of many
similar campaigns, and connections were made to student uprisings outside of Pakistan
both by students at Dhaka University and other parts of the world (Ali 2005).
 
Local Context: Politics and Parties in East Pakistan
6 The East Pakistan local political context was in a period of fragmentation both at the
campus  level  and  more  broadly.  Politically  in  East  Pakistan,  the  two  parties  that
dominated were the Leftist party of the National Awami League (NAP) and the more
centrist  Awami League,  now under the clear leadership of  Sheikh Mujibar Rahman.
Among the students both were highly influential.
7 The NAP, however, was divided between a pro-Soviet faction and a pro-Maoist faction.
The splits in the party had a significant impact on the Dhaka University campus as well;
two major groups formed within the Left oriented students, referred to as the Motia
group (the pro-Soviet faction under the leadership of Motia Chowdury) and the Menon
group  (the  pro-Chinese  bloc  under  the  leadership  Rashed  Khan  Menon).  The  two
groups were not hostile in their interactions, but the split illustrates a way in which
international context played out at student level.
8 Also  acutely  relevant  at  the  local  scale  was  the  state’s  shifting  strategy  toward
managing the contentious student population of Dhaka University. In 1962, Ayub Khan
had appointed a new provincial governor to East Pakistan, Abdul Monem Khan. Monem
Khan was enormously unpopular, particularly among students. He believed that Dhaka
University’s politicized students presented a threat to state stability and he directed a
concentrated campaign to undermine the political power that the place represented.
Within  months  of  his  appointment,  he  replaced  the  vice-chancellor  with  a  more
cooperative figure and orchestrated the firing of several known dissident professors
(Rahman 1995:23; Umar 2000:120–3). In a speech given in December 1963, Monem Khan
chastised students for being “distracted” by politics, arguing that:
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The first and foremost responsibility of students is to devote themselves to
their  studies.  By  and  large  the  student  community  is  aware  of  its
responsibilities. But there are always those who for their narrow and limited
purpose  take  every  opportunity  to  encourage  strikes  and  disorder  in
educational institutions. (Kitamura 2000:118).
The argument that students as a community should not be a politicized unit is a line of
reasoning  Monem  Khan  maintained  throughout  his  governorship,  and  one  that  he
mentioned  in  every  single  annual  address  to  the  province  from  1963  until  1968
(Kitamura 2000:119). His continued insistence on the point, however, also indicates his
inability to gain any real ground on the problem.
9 In  an  effort to  undermine  the  campus  political  structure,  Monem  Khan  created  a
student group of his own, the National Students’ Federation (NSF) (Hannan 1987:272).
Despite Monem Khan’s position that students ought to avoid political activity, the NSF
organized rallies and demonstrations in support of government policies, and created
chaos and havoc at other groups’ events. Kabil, a student activist that attended Dhaka
University at the time recalls:
The NSF were hooligans. They violently disrupted processions and they made
it impossible to meet. Once I remember, they sat under the Amtolla (a tree on
campus where the Left groups regularly met) for the whole evening just so
that other groups could not convene there (Personal interview 2008).1
Similarly, in his memoir of his days on campus, Dr. Nurul Nabi (2010) describes the NSF
confrontations, recalling:
The party was comprised of opportunistic students from elitist families. The
NSF recruits were the sons of members of the Convention Muslim League
Party and bureaucrats. With the direct support of the government, the NSF’s
job was to harass and frighten the activists  … from participating in anti-
government activities…One day after class, I was walking to the hall along
the bank of the pond. As I walked I saw a couple of NSF thugs taking turns
beating up another student. …Another incident of NSF bullying occurred one
evening after dinner…Suddenly we heard pandemonium coming from the
corridor outside. We came out of our dorm to see what was going on. We saw
a number of NSF thugs with daggers and sticks in hand, screaming in the
hallway,  hurling  abusive  words  toward  Chatro  League  followers  and
frantically hunting for their rooms…Before we could collect our thoughts, we
heard violent kicks at our door. They were screaming at us and threatened to
shoot the door down if we didn’t open it…They rushed in and asked, point
blank, who among us was a Chatro League activist…one of the attackers and
a student from the Biochemistry department recognized me…he told them to
leave us alone and luckily they did (pp. 102–4).
The  NSF’s  focus  on  rooting  out  and  terrorizing  student  activists  belies  the
government’s anxiety at the effectiveness of the organizations on campus.
10 The NSF was successful in many of its attempts to infiltrate the space of the campus,
but it could not fully disrupt it. In a show of solidarity, in 1964, the Dhaka University
convocation was boycotted by all of the student groups on campus (with the obvious
exception of the NSF). Umar (2006) describes the event:
Governor Monem Khan was the ex-officio chancellor of the Dhaka University
and he was to preside over the convocation to be held in Curzon Hall…on the
appointed day, 22 March, when the Governor took the chair…the students,
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and with them teachers (those wearing ceremonial gowns), stood up and left
the specially erected dais.  This resulted in a comic situation in which the
chancellor, vice-chancellor and other university authorities remained sitting
in  their  chairs  with  nobody  before  them,  under  the  huge  shamiana
(decorative tent) with chairs turned upside down! (p.112).
The  event  was  widely  covered  in  the  press,  since  they  had  all  been  there  for  the
ceremony, and it was a major embarrassment to the administration. Umar (2006) points
out:  “The  newspaper  reports  and  photographs  of  the  failed  convocation  ceremony
caused  considerable  satisfaction  in  the  opposition  circles  and  it  helped  the  anti-
government mobilization considerably” (p. 112).  It  was also an important statement
about the campus as a place of non-cooperation with Monem Khan and the regime he
represented. He may have been officially the chancellor (the governor is the chancellor
of all higher educational institutions, and the administrative head of the school is the
vice-chancellor) but the limits of the government’s power in that space were clearly
demonstrated. Students at Dhaka University, while fragmented into multiple political
groups, were largely united when it came time to demonstrate their ability to mobilize
as a campus community.
 
Regional Discontent and Solidarity: Ayub’s
Miscalculations at Home and Abroad
11 The regional context of South Asian politics in the sixties is another important scale in
which Dhaka University student mobilizations of the 1960s engaged. In January 1965,
Ayub Khan was sworn in as President of Pakistan under a cloud of discontent. What
followed over the course of the next year was a series of miscalculations that ultimately
destabilized the  entire  regime and positioned students  in  both wings  of his  nation
against him. The election had not taken place with full adult suffrage, and had been
contested between Ayub Khan as the government’s candidate and Ms. Fatima Jinnah as
a united opposition candidate. Even though he claimed victory in the elections, the
majority of the population in both East Pakistan and West Pakistan had not been given
franchise, and thus, the legitimacy of the regime was seen no differently than prior to
the elections. Just a few months later, Pakistan became embroiled in the messy Indo-
Pakistani War of 1965.
12 The war with India, also often referred to as the Second Kashmir War, revolved around
the disputed territory of the Kashmir region. The dispute was a continuation of the
unresolved border agreement of  the 1947 Partition,  and in 1965 the conflict  took a
sudden and swift turn in terms of military and industrial force on both sides. First a
series of skirmishes in April, and then in a highly deadly period of three weeks of all-
out  battle  in  September,  the  conflict  drew international  concern  for  its  explosive
potential. In West Pakistan, the war effort was initially more popular, as the border was
part of the Western province and there were stronger anti-Indian sentiments in that
wing. In East Pakistan, however, the issue of Kashmir resonated far less meaningfully.
Patricia Walton Hill, (n.d.) an American who lived in East Pakistan during the 1960s
observed in her memoir the lack of interest felt by many East Pakistanis regarding the
war over Kashmir. She quotes a conversation about it she had with a Bengali on the
street who told her:
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Kashmir! Government make a lot of noise, make trouble with India about
Kashmir…What do Bengalis care about Kashmir? They have more Muslims in
West Bengal in India than in Kashmir… When trouble with India, is hard for
Bengalis…  West  Bengal  has  so  many  things  we  need  here—fruit  and
vegetables all year, and good cloth, but we can never get them now (n.d.:
108).
The war was not only unnecessary to the East Pakistanis, it also disrupted the delicate
regional balance of local trade and security. Thus, rather than stoking nationalist pride,
as Ayub hoped the war would do and which public appeals for support drew upon, the
war deepened the resentment in the Eastern province.
13 The war was also a military strategic failure on the part of Pakistan. First, Ayub had
been convinced that the population in key areas of the Kashmir region would rise up
with Pakistani troops in resistance to Indian occupation;  that support had failed to
materialize on the ground, leaving the Pakistani troops unsupported and with poor
quality intelligence. The conflict also proved that militarily Indian forces were able to
advance far more effectively than Pakistani troops on both land and by air, a reality of
the ongoing conflict that Pakistan’s population was not prepared to face. It ended in a
cease-fire,  mediated in Tashkent by the Soviet  Union,  at  the bequest  of  the United
Nations; at the time of the cease-fire, Indian troops were poised to take Lahore and a
Pakistani defeat was imminent. As many scholars argue, the mutual cease-fire was the
best-case scenario for Pakistan who had virtually lost the war already (Schofield 2003;
Ziring 1992; Vaish 2011).
14 Yet the agreement at Tashkent was not seen by the population of Pakistan as a success
in any way. The agreement drove a wedge between Ayub and his close ally, Foreign
Minister  Zulfikar  Ali  Bhutto.  Bhutto,  a  young and  rising  star  in  the  West  Pakistan
political scene, was expected to follow Ayub’s political legacy in the Presidency. He was
however, intensely critical of the agreement and of the lack of intervention by Western
allies, particularly the United States, in the face of such a humiliating defeat. Lawrence
Ziring (1992) describes the mood of the post-Tashkent homecoming:
News  of  the  agreement  in  Tashkent  shocked  the  Pakistanis,  who  had
expected something quite  different.  Virtually  everyone believed the talks
would fail, and preparations were underway to welcome Ayub back as a hero
of the people. But when news was relayed in the evening over Radio Pakistan
there was only surprise and dismay…When the President finally returned to
Rawalpindi there were no celebrations, no press conferences, and no high-
level meetings. Ayub did not even seem inclined to explain why he chose to
sign the agreement and went into immediate seclusion (p. 67–8).
Even  in  East  Pakistan,  where  the  war  had  been  unpopular  all  along,  there  was
widespread dissatisfaction with the entire affair. Ayub’s miscalculations in 1965 made it
a difficult year for his regime, but he had also set into motion two movements, one in
each wing of his nation, both spearheaded by students, that would eventually end his
rule altogether. This regional geographic and political context of South Asian conflict is
another scale at which Dhaka University students in the 1960s mobilized and which was
intertwined within the movement on campus.
15 In both East and West Pakistan, students played pivotal roles in the movements that
developed in the war’s aftermath. In fact, although there was limited physical contact
between the two student mobilizations, the shared rhetoric of the need for democracy
A Campus in Context: East Pakistan’s “Mass Upsurge” at Local, Regional, and I...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 22 | 2019
6
in Pakistan created a unique bond between students in the two provincial movements.
Although  technically  part  of  one  nation,  and  working  to  overthrow  the  same
government that ruled them both, the movements operated in relative independence
of  each other.  That said,  there was still  a  shared identity between the students,  as
“students of Pakistan,” and a relationship that was different than the shared identity
with a larger, imagined global youth community. Thus, the shared campaign of the two
wings (physical and in solidarity) represents another scale of the political activity of
Dhaka University students.
16 In West Pakistan,  students took to the streets in protest  just  48 hours after Ayub’s
return. Riots and demonstrations, led by students but adding others as they progressed,
brought  major  urban  cities  to  a  standstill,  particularly  Lahore.  The  Pakistan  Times
reported:
Rioting  began  sometime  after  noon.  The police  ordered  a  halt  to  the
marchers  converging  on  the  city,  many  of  whom  were  joined  by  veiled
women who carried children said to be the dependents of men killed in the
war…All  attempts  to  stop  the  students  were  answered  with  increased
resistance and rowdiness. Soon the brickbatting began and the police were
ordered to counterattack using their tear gas canisters. The battle raged for
several  hours…the disorder spread around the areas surrounding the city
colleges where the police, on the defensive, resorted to shooting. An official
government announcement stated that the first victim was a policeman and
that the struggle grew as a result (1966).
The riots grew over the next several days and the student unrest, tapping into older
grievances, changed messages from focused complaints that the government had “sold
Kashmir” to larger claims of a need for greater democracy in the government. This
escalation  was  a  source  of  concern  for  the  government  scrambling  to  contain  the
unrest, and officials worried that the unrest would spread too far into other segments
of society (Ziring 1992:71). In an effort to quell the movement quickly, the government
took a conciliatory tone with students, responding to demands by releasing arrested
students and allowing campuses to open back up. Yet there was already in motion a
fundamental shift in the nature of the relationship between students in West Pakistan
and the government. Ziring (1992) describes: “The students had no confidence in the
Ayub regime, and all government acts were interpreted as tactics aimed at neutralizing
student activism. Conflict, not cooperation, became the norm” (p. 74). A cable sent to
the United States Department of State on February 7, 1966 describes:
Pres. Ayub is in political trouble as a consequence of his new foreign policy
orientation  expressed  most  recently  in  the  conciliatory  Tashkent
declaration…East Paks much less aroused about Tashkent than West wing.
Fortunately opposition groups divided and, for many, Tashkent less an issue
per se than tempting opportunity to embarrass govt. Such attempts make
impression on students but not average Pakistani…Most East Pak opposition
leaders wish to attack Ayub for authoritative practices and undemocratic
emergency restrictions,  and there  may be some sentiment  for  promoting
East  Pak  autonomy  except  for  foreign,  defense,  and  monetary  affairs
(Khan 1999:146).
The assessment is correct on several points: East Pakistanis were less concerned about
the  terms  of  Tashkent  than  Western  citizens  were;  opposition  groups  were  highly
divided  and  scattered;  students  were  among  the  vanguard  in  finding  pleasure  in
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embarrassing the government. Yet the assessment ultimately misses the mark on the
extent  to  which  students  represented  a  different  set  of  interests  than the  broader
population. Rather than a generalized, possible move for autonomy, there was by this
point in time a quite well developed sense in East Pakistan that autonomy might be the
only option for the abused eastern province—but that rhetoric was deeply rooted in
and emanating from students,  not  apart  from them. Further,  it  was  not  politicians
manipulating students, but rather, politicians responding to the power bloc students
represented and informed by students’ analysis. Mozzamel Hoque (1993) points out:
Seen  in  retrospect,  the  policies  of  the  period  from  1960  to  1970  were
dominated by three main issues: (i) political parity, (ii) economic rights and
(iii)  cultural  autonomy.  All  three  of  them  owed  their  genesis  to  ideas
propounded  by  Dhaka  University  students  and  intelligentsia.  The
University’s role had become so pivotal that it is impossible to understand
any one of the issues or the scores of ancillary issues of the time without
reference to it (p. 37).
Indeed,  just  two  days  prior  to  the  assessment  cable,  on  February 5, 1966,  Sheikh
Mujibar  Rahman proclaimed the  Six  Point  Program,  demanding  regional  autonomy
based on a confederation between the two wings. The Six Point Program was actually
the outgrowth of the Two Economy Theory, which had its roots at Dhaka University. In
March of 1965,  Chatro League, the student group affiliated with the Awami League,
published a pamphlet entitled “Pakistaner Anchalik Baishamya” (Pakistan’s Regional
Disparity)  written  by  a  Dhaka  university  student,  Abul  Kalam  Azad.  The  pamphlet
enumerated vast differences in expenditure, imports and exports, both in foreign terms
and  inter-zonal  trade  terms.  The  pamphlet  argued  that  if  national  unity  meant
colonization of East Bengal, then national unity was not possible. It called on students
to join Chatro League in resisting the unfair exploitation of their brothers and sisters.
The  Two  Economy  Theory  was  the  product  of  several  professors  in  the  Dhaka
University Economics department, who published papers and commentaries in local
newspapers arguing that the economic exploitation of the Eastern provinces amounted
to colonialism, and advocating for a confederated economic system between the wings
to  replace  the  federalized system in  place  (Chakravarty 1978:134–35).  The Six  Point
Program was presented in the form of a pamphlet called “Amader Baachar Dabi”, or
“Our Right to Live.” It argued for the same economic autonomy advocated in the Two
Economy  theory,  but  it  was  more  specific  in  calls  for  separate  taxation,  financial
systems, and foreign trade agreements, and advocated for paramilitary troops for the
eastern  province.  The  only  aspects  the  two  wings  should  share  were  defense  and
foreign affairs.
17 Students in East Pakistan enthusiastically supported the Six Point Program. While some
students affiliated with further Left  groups did argue that the plan was not radical
enough and advocated for  a  more revolutionary platform,  Chatro League and their
followers responded with strong support (as would be expected given their association
with the Awami League). They launched a week long program of action culminating
with Ekushe celebrations on February 21. Here, students made important connections
between the legacy of the Bhasha Andolan and the new calls for regional autonomy.
They articulated their cause as “Bengali linguistic nationalism” and explicitly framed
Bengali identity as defined by shared language. Indeed, the pamphlets and speeches
made at the event directly stated that the first battles for autonomy had been fought by
the Language Martyrs (Humayun and Khalid 1996).
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18 The connection of the Six Points to the Bhasha Andolan was important in several ways.
First, it imbued a populism into the Six Points movement that implied support more
dispersed than party allegiance. Second, it connected the Six Points Program to the
campus of Dhaka University and to the legacy of student mobilization. Finally, it tapped
into an emotionally familiar trope in the resentment between the wings by reminding
East Pakistanis about the Central government’s disrespect for their mother tongue and
stoking feelings of regional pride and for martyrdom. This final aspect was particularly
important,  as  the  Awami  League  gained  a  strong  advantage  in  popular  appeal  by
tapping into regional grievance, while the NAP, already struggling with its own internal
divisions,  failed  to  articulate  a  platform  that  resonated  as  emotionally  with  the
population. Kabil, the same student quoted earlier, recalls, “The problem with the Left
was  that  it  was  always  about  Pakistan.  They  were  so  interested  in  revolution  for
Pakistan  that  they  missed  what  was  happening  in  their  own  home”  (Personal
interview 2008).  Umar (2006)  amplifies  this  point,  and  speculates  that  the  rise  in
popularity of the Awami League following the Six Points was as much a failure of the
far Left to read the East Pakistani political disposition as it was a success of the Awami
League to frame discontent in regionalist terms. He argues:
…the situation in East Pakistan was such that…people were just not used to
looking for the real and basic reasons for their exploitation and repression.
They were not  politically  educated,  even by the Left,  to  develop such an
outlook. They were thus getting more and more impatient to fight the enemy
in whatever manner possible and those whom they identified as their enemy
were those who ethnically, linguistically, and culturally were alien to them
and inhabited a land a thousand miles away from East Pakistan (p. 114).
Kabil and Umar both recognize the period as one in which the Awami League shifted in
position to become the major political force, but the Left, particularly on the campus,
did still command a sizable following.
19 Students also emphasized that regional autonomy did not mean that they were not still
connected with their comrades in West Pakistan. Indeed, in the program of the NAP,
conditions of workers in West Pakistan are addressed with as much attention as the
Eastern  disparity,  and  the  program  directly  calls  for  an  end  to  repression  in
Baluchistan,  a  region  in  West  Pakistan  that  was  making  similar  claims  of  regional
discrimination as East Bengal (Bukhari 2010). Thus, while this limited their ability to
capitalize  on  Eastern  wing  resentment,  it  did  create  a  platform  of  solidarity  with
student movements in the Western wing that were an important link in the overall
campaign to unseat Ayub.
20 As  Mujib  and  his  Six  Point  Program  gained  momentum  in  the  Eastern  wing,  the
government scrambled to contain it. The frequency of arrests increased dramatically,
and  the  number  of  “rioters”  being  held  without  due  process  became  a  point  of
mobilization  in  of  itself.  Mujib  continued  to  travel  around  the  Eastern  province
promoting the Six Points and in May 1966 the government arrested and detained Mujib
following a political  rally.  After almost  two years without charges,  the government
announced  suddenly  in  1968  that  Mujib  and  34  other  political  figures  were  being
charged  with  conspiring  with  India  to  destabilize  Pakistan  through  a  secession
movement. The charges were intended to deal a crushing blow to both Mujib and the
entire autonomy movement. From the perspective of the government, conspiring with
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India,  or  even being accused of  such,  was political  death.  Kamruddin Ahmed (1975)
explains:
The government thought that the people will  rise against Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman  when  they  would  learn  about  the  conspiracy  with  India…The
government  expected  that  before  the  end  of  the  trial  the  people  would
demand capital  punishment for the accused persons.  Zafar,  the then Law
Minister,  told  the  writer  those  days that  it  would  be  difficult  for  the
government to save his family from mob fury (p. 206).
Things did not go as planned for the government however, and the Agartala Conspiracy
Case, as the case came to be known, was a political boon for Mujib, the Awami League,
and the cause of East Pakistan autonomy.
21 In an Airgram sent to the US Department of State, the reaction of students to Mujib’s
charge is depicted:
In  the quiet  pre-dawn hours  of  a  morning in  early  January,  army troops
armed with submachine guns and rifles removed a slight manacled man from
the Dacca Central jail where he had been locked up for almost two years.
Word of his removal passed the city the “bazaar telegraph”—“The Army has
taken Mujib”—but no one knew where. Several law students met at a room at
Dacca U.’s  Iqbal Hall  and asked themselves what they could do about the
army’s  seizing  Mujib.  The  old  means  of  protest—mass  meetings  and
demonstrations—seemed  somehow  inadequate;  but  no  one  could  suggest
alternate  tactics  and  some  of  the  boys  were  afraid…Bewilderment,
frustration, and fear again beset the young educated Bengal, and hatred of
the Rawalpindi establishment was germinating in still more Bengali breasts.
(Khan 1999:248).
The cable also warns that “if Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is dragged into a public trial for
obvious political reasons without a convincing case against him he could be enshrined
as a martyr to the cause of Bengal autonomy” (Khan 1999:248).  The assessment was
quite correct; instead of destabilizing the autonomy movement in the East, it gave the
scattered political scene new focus and consolidated the disparate set of grievances
into a single shared symbolic cause of Mujib’s unfair arrest.
22 Nurun Nabi (2010) recalled:
The Agartala Conspiracy Case made the student community and particularly
the Chatra League, more rebellious and resilient in their cause. Most of the
Awami League leaders were behind bars and it was the student leaders who
filled this void and kept the movement alive and vigorous. Three student
parties,  namely  the  Chatra  League,  Chatra  Union  (Menon  Group),  Chatra
Union  (Motia  Group)  joined  hands  and  intensified  the  anti-government
movement…even a faction of the NSF was inspired to detach itself and join
the  anti-government  movement.  By  November  1968,  the  movement  had
turned into a full-fledged student revolution (p. 117).
The case did indeed bring the campus together. Just as in previous moments of crisis,
leaders  from  the  major  groups  came  together  and  formed  an  All-Party  Student
Committee of Action (SCA) and formulated an 11-point program of action. Remarkably,
even the pro-government creation NSF fell apart as the majority of the group defected
to join the anti-government campaign. The conversion of these students was,  on at
least some level, testament to the transformative capacity of the oppositional culture
on the campus (Nabi 2010).
A Campus in Context: East Pakistan’s “Mass Upsurge” at Local, Regional, and I...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 22 | 2019
10
23 The Eleven Points, which expanded on Mujib’s Six Points, represented an important
convergence of not only the issues of the East Pakistan students, but demands of West
Pakistan as well. The demands also captured the ethos of the student idealism, with
local specific grievances alongside larger more socialist-inspired demands. The Eleven
Points of the SCA were:
(1)14  Specific  demands  relating  to  education,  including  the  rejection  of
several University Ordinances; (2) Restoration of democracy and universal
adult  franchise;  (3)  autonomy for East Pakistan along the lines of  the Six
Point;  (4)establishment  of  a  subfederation  in  West  Pakistan,  giving  full
autonomy  to  Baluchistan,  the  North  West  Frontier  Province  and  Sind;
(5)nationalization of  all  banks,  insurance companies  and big  industry;  (6)
reduction  of  taxes  on  agriculturalists;  (7)  payment  of  proper  wages  to
laborers; (8) the introduction of flood control in East Pakistan; (9) lifting of
the state of emergency, public safety acts and other repressive measures;
(10) formation of an independent foreign policy, including withdrawal from
CENTO and SEATO pacts; (11) release of all political prisoners and students
and the dropping of all political cases including the Agartala Conspiracy Case
(Humayun and Khalid 1996:362–7).
The Eleven Points expanded the appeal of the movement to a wider audience than the
Six Points had, and, importantly, opened the movement up to West Pakistan solidarity
and participation. Tofail Ahmad, who was Chairman of the SCA recalls:
We were the 10 leaders of the students and we came together to make the
program in the spirit of the students, and of the people. We worked tirelessly
to  spread  the  movement—we  were  in  touch  with  some  leaders,  but  not
following orders. We were accountable to the students—I was elected as VP
of DUCSU by the whole student body. During the Eleven Points formation we
were  truly  a  representative  body  of  the  students  and  the  desires  of  the
people (Personal interview 2010).
Tofail  Ahmad  had  a  close  working  relationship  with  Mujib,  and  this  undoubtedly
facilitated a closer relationship between the students at large and Mujib. Ahmad recalls
his personal relationship with Mujib, as well the connection of Mujib to the students:
He was like a father to me. We looked to him for guidance but his manner
was not like a stern figure. We were united in our conviction to free him
from the unjust imprisonment of the Agartala Conspiracy. It was a complete
fabrication.  It  showed  the  people  the  true  colors  of  the  Ayub  Khan
government (Personal interview 2010).
The Agartala Conspiracy Case had provoked precisely the opposite of the government’s
intent. The movement was more powerful than ever, and it was spearheaded by the
most  radical  elements  of  political  society:  the  students.  It  had  also  emboldened  a
regional  alliance  of  demands  from  students  that  was  an  unanticipated  scale  of
resistance. Thus, with regard to movement scale for Dhaka University students in the
sixties, localized issues were still critically important, but they were informed and
contextualized by broader regional issues such as the Indo-Pak War of 1965 and the
national  issue  of  Ayub’s  perceived  anti-democratic  rule;  these  connections  brought
their identity as students at Dhaka University into conversation and solidarity with
students at other Pakistani campuses.
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1968: Mass Upsurge and “The Angry Young World”
24 In 1968, of course, students were causing headaches for government leaders far beyond
Pakistan’s  national  borders  and regional  scale.  While  newspapers  were under strict
censorship and were limited in their ability to run stories about the activities of anti-
government activity in Pakistan, they were free to report on the activities of students
elsewhere, and they did so in high volume. In fact, in the Pakistan Observer for the year
of 1968, student uprisings dominate the coverage, occupying as much attention as the
Vietnam War. There was also a weekly column reporting on student political uprisings
entitled “The Angry Young World” which ran articles on a variety of uprisings. The
sense from reading these dailies was of a world being turned upside by youth revolt;
thus, even though the papers did not have any stories regarding student activity in
Pakistan, they fomented a spirit of youth political agency through reportage on other
arenas,  and created an international  scale  into which students  at  Dhaka University
could  place  themselves.  These  newspaper  stories  provided  the  linkage  of  Dhaka
University students with the larger “imagined community” of the youth in the Global
Sixties (Anderson 1991; Zolov 1999). Of particular interest was the rising young star in
the British New Left,  Tariq Ali.  In an article entitled “Britain’s  Student Revolt  Goes
International” the international spirit of “1968” is personified by Ali:
Britain’s  Rudi Dutshke is  a Pakistani 24-year-old Oxford student Tariq Ali
whose  energetic  face,  with  its  black  mustache,  is  today  the  very  face  of
student agitation in Britain…The mission that Tariq Ali has set himself and
that of his followers is to make heard, as loudly as possible, the protest of a
whole  youth  against  the  actual  state  of  the  world…For  the  first  time  in
history,  Britain  today  has  an  internationalist  youth.  However  limited  its
action may be currently, it is opening a new era (d’Etchevers 1968).
Articles such as these connected Pakistani students directly to the global uprising of
youth political activity in 1968. They also made Tariq Ali a powerfully exciting figure,
and students were eager to make contact. As he wrote in his memoir:
The student movement in Pakistan (which then included Bangladesh) was in
its fourth month of struggle and the revolt had extended to every town in
the  country.  The  Student Action  Committee  from  Rawalpindi  and  Dhaka
were  pressing  me  to  return.  I  was  determined  to  see  it  all  for  myself
(Ali 2005:319)
Ali (2005) made arrangements to visit each wing, and after his visit to West Pakistan,
where he was well received, he was certain that, “The entire country seemed to be
crying out for change, but before I could accurately estimate the possibilities I had to
visit East Pakistan” (p. 323).  Ali’s  experience in Dhaka depicts clearly the fluidity of
identity in the period. On one hand he was an international figure, on another he was a
West Pakistani, and yet he found common ground while simultaneously recognizing
the local specificity, explaining:
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I was only in Dhaka for a few days, but it became very clear that this was a
different  world.  Linguistically,  culturally  and politically  it  was  a  separate
nation. Its oppression made it difficult not to become a separate state. And
yet,  I  felt  more  at  ease,  intellectually  and  politically,  in  Dhaka  than  in
Rawalpindi. The political culture was far more advanced. I spoke at a large
student  meeting  underneath  the  famous  Amtala  tree  on  the  Dhaka
University campus (2005:323).
Ali’s speech was important on multiple levels. As a figure, he represented an important
blurring of the distinctions between East and West Pakistan, as well as international
identity.  His  visit  and his  support  for  the East  Pakistan movement represented the
mutually constitutive relationships between the scales that the mobilization existed
within.
25 Protest against the Ayub regime extended through the diaspora community as well, as
students in London overtook and occupied the Pakistan High Commission building. The
London Times reported:
More than 100 Pakistani students took over the Pakistan High Commission
Building…after a stormy protest meeting at which students condemned the
Ayub regime. They occupied two floors of the building…Demonstrators lined
the balcony chanting and waving placards saying: ‘This building is occupied’
and ‘Ayub Out.’ (Ali 2005:244–45).
Students were united at local, regional and even international scales with a sense of
political agency and power.
26 The final blow to the Ayub regime actually began in West Pakistan. Over the course of
the  years  1967  and  1968,  Bhutto  had  completely  distanced  himself  from Ayub and
launched  a  new  political  party.  The  Pakistan  People’s  Party  (PPP)  had  gained
considerable  following with the students  in the West.  Bhutto had even visited East
Pakistan in 1967, although his visit was not as successful at garnering support there as
he hoped. Bhutto was an outspoken critic of Sheikh Mujib (in fact the two men had
made no secret of their mutual dislike of each other) and at the time of Bhutto’s visit,
Mujib’s incarceration had already elevated him to a status of martyr (Khan 1999:235–8).
When Bhutto was arrested in West Pakistan in November 1968, West Pakistani students
responded with force. Riots broke out in Rawalpindi, Peshawar, and Karachi, along with
small  demonstration on other  campuses.  Students  attacked government offices  and
demanded,  by force,  the release of  Bhutto and Ayub’s resignation.  The riots gained
international  attention  as  they  grew  and  students  attacked  foreign  offices  and
institutions. (Kitamura 2000:128–31).
27 In Dhaka, the students responded to the uprisings in the West by escalating the Eleven
Point Campaign. The leaders of SAC met at Modhur Canteen and devised a plan to bring
the Ayub regime to its knees. Tofail Ahmed recalls the moments just before the group
launched a series of strikes in January 1969 that would come to be called Mass Upsurge,
“It was no longer just autonomy. We needed total governmental structural change.”
(Personal interview 2010). The group decided that they would call for a General Strike
on January 5, 1969.  The call  for  the strike was heeded by all  of  the major  political
parties. In response to the unity of the SAC, the political parties formed the Democratic
Action Committee as a united platform to free all political prisoners and to suspend the
Ayub Khan government.
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28 The days following the January 5th general strike were filled with constant agitation in
Dhaka.  The  Guardian  newspaper,  commenting  on  the  situation,  even  called  Tofail
Ahmed,  the  Chairman  of  SAC  and  VP  of  DUCSU,  the  “virtual  governor”  of  Dhaka
(Kamol 2010:12). The processions were growing larger and larger each day, and the city
was  no  longer  functioning. Demonstrations  against  the  regime  were  reaching  into
numbers for 40,000 to 50,000 in attendance (Umar 2006:154–63). On January 20th the
movement took a deadly turn. A massive procession of students had begun to march
from  the  Amtolla  to  the  General  Secretariat.  Police  opened  fire  and  attacked  the
students. Nabi (2010) recalls:
The  police  confronted  the  protesters.  A  student  leader  of  Chatra  Union
named  Asad  was  at  the  forefront  of  the  procession.  A  police  officer
approached Asad and brandished his  gun at  point  blank range.  He  fired.
Asad’s lifeless body fell to the street. We couldn’t believe what we had just
seen.  Anger  filled  our  blood  as  we  charged  to  the  site.  The  police,
overwhelmed,  retreated.  Asad’s  body  was  recovered  and  brought  to  the
college (p. 122).
The brutal assassination of Asad uz Zamman, a History student at Dhaka University and
a well-known political  activist  on campus,  had a profound mobilizing effect  on the
movement. The student community was affected deeply and personally by the death of
such a popular and prominent member of the campus. A gruesome image of his dead
body just after being shot, with blood pouring from the back of him was printed on the
cover of virtually every newspaper the next morning, and SAC declared three days of
mourning on his behalf.
29 Students gathered the morning after the death and raised Asad’s bloodied shirt onto a
pole.  Thousands  of  students  gathered  in  mourning  for  their  fallen  comrade.  Tofail
Ahmad recalls, “At that day, we took an oath that Asad’s death would not be in vain. He
was one of us—not just a Bengali—a student of Dhaka University, truly one of us. We
felt  a  sadness  deep  in  our  bellies”  (Personal  interview 2010).  Asad  was  declared  a
martyr by the students. A well circulated poem for the martyred Asad, captures the
mood of the students,
Like bunches of blood-red Oleander, 
Like flaming clouds at sunset
Asad’s shirt flutters
In the gusty wind, in the limitless blue. 
To the brother’s spotless shirt
His sister had sown
With the fine gold thread
Of her heart’s desire
Buttons which shone like stars;
How often had his ageing mother,
With such tender care,
Hung that shirt out to dry
In her sunny courtyard.
Now that self-same shirt
Has deserted the mother’s courtyard, 
Adorned by bright sunlight
And the soft shadow
Cast by the pomegranate tree,
Now it flutters
On the city’s main street,
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On top of the belching factory chimneys, 
In every nook and corner
Of the echoing avenues,
How it flutters
With no respite
In the sun-scorched stretches
Of our parched hearts,
At every muster of conscious people
Uniting in a common purpose.
Our weakness, our cowardice
The stain of our guilt and shame-
All are hidden from the public gaze
By this pitiful piece of torn raiment Asad’s shirt has become 
Our pulsating hearts’ rebellious banner. (Hashim 2007:14).
The day after the three-day mourning period, a gathering occurred just off the Dhaka
University grounds that exceeded 100,000 demonstrators from a wide swath of society.
Protesters carried placards with Asad’s image, as well as the images of the Language
Martyrs from the Bhasha Andolan. During a march protesting Asad’s murder, police
again opened fire, killing more demonstrators (Hannan 1991:371).
30 By the end of January, the government had virtually no control of the Eastern province
and the  students  in  West  Pakistan,  following  the  direction  of  Bhutto,  were  rioting
again. In an article in a weekly news magazine Holiday,  in February 1969, Badruddin
Umar  commented,  “…the  students  have  emerged as  a  powerful  political  factor  not
because  it  is  an accident,  but  because  they  are  performing a  historical  task  in  the
development of our society” (p. 6). He chastised the political parties for their inability
to show the same unity and sophistication as the students demonstrated in the Eleven
Point  Program,  arguing,  “It  is  precisely  because  the  students  have  announced  a
programme which is very much in conformity with the thinking of the ordinary people
—the peasants, the workers, the middle class, the students…that the people have rallied
around their eleven point program” (1969:6). The movement had taken on dimensions
that were beyond the demands of the Six Points, thanks to the students, and it had
become imbued with a sense of power that Ayub could not ignore.
31 Ayub announced, on February 21, 1969 that he would not run for office in the next
election. The date of the announcement, February 21, as the day the largest student
movement success in the nation’s history, the Bhasha Andolan, celebrated annually,
was certainly not an accident. He devised a plan for constitutional reforms and planned
for  roundtable  talks  to  discuss  the  reforms  with  major  political  leaders.  He  also
released  the  prisoners  of  the  Agartala  Conspiracy  Case,  including  Mujib.  On
February 24, 1969, Sheikh Mujib went before a crowd of over 100,000 people at the race
course  grounds  near  Dhaka  University,  and  embraced  Tofail  Ahmed,  thanking  the
students  for  their  work  and  dedication.  At  this  event,  Ahmed  placed  a  garland  of
flowers around Mujib’s neck and gave him the title “Bangabandhu” (friend of Bengal).
This title stayed with Mujib throughout his life, and is still used as an affectionate and
honorific term for Mujib (Hussain 2011).
32 The roundtable talks fell apart, and finally, after months of chaos and disorder, Ayub
conceded defeat and stepped down from power in March 1969. He handed over power
to an interim military administration, headed by General Yahya Khan. Yahya declared
Martial Law, but also declared that national elections would be held within a year. The
Mass Upsurge movement had shaken the Pakistani state to its core and the students of
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Dhaka University felt an empowerment that was on scales both geographically and in
terms of community that was unprecedented. In terms of the Global Sixties, students in
Pakistan had achieved what revolutionary young people across the world desired: they
had literally brought down the ruling regime.
 
Conclusion
33 Student  activism  in  the  late  1960s  at  Dhaka  University  cannot  be  contained  in  a
narrative  of  nationalism nor  of  internationalism,  and as  such,  serves  as  a  valuable
example elucidating the overlapping scales  at  which movement identity  functioned
simultaneously. While certainly at times, as demonstrated in the discussion of the local
context, students were addressing specific and unique circumstances tied to their most
immediate location (the campus), at other times, as demonstrated in the regional and
international contexts, that same campus served as a place where students enacted and
articulated  their  actions  as  part  of  larger  frameworks  of  understanding.  Thus  the
campus itself, as a place, also did not function within a singular scale symbolically for
students. Overall, as scholars continue to seek understanding of the student activism of
the 1960s as a pattern of “Restless Youth” occurring across the world, the case study of
Dhaka University provides a useful example of the importance of considering various
scales  of  context  (local,  regional,  international)  as  interdependent  and  mutually
constitutive in the actions and imaginations of movement participants as they define
both themselves and the places they claim as their own.
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NOTES
1. The oral histories referenced in this article were conducted over an initial period of three
years in various locations in Bangladesh with the financial support of the American Institute for
Bangladesh Studies and the American Institute of Pakistan Studies,  as well  as the support of
Dhaka  University,  Independent  University  Bangladesh  and  the  Bangladesh  Liberation  War
Museum. With the exception of cases in which participants specifically requested their real name
be used, I have used pseudonyms for interviewees given some of the politically sensitive opinions
they have shared. 
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